What Francis Fukuyama Is Seeing at 'The End of History'

Fukuyama's "end of history" thesis described liberal democracy and a market economy as the apparent endpoint of social development, but he now points to democratic backsliding, the rise of illiberal ideologies, and Freedom House's reported decline in global freedom as evidence that this model is under strain. He also says the United States has become a less persuasive democratic example, including for his Chinese students.

Fukuyama argues that younger generations who grew up after the Berlin Wall fell may take liberal democracy's peace and prosperity for granted because they lack firsthand experience of communist dictatorship. In his view, liberalism's tolerance of disagreement can also frustrate people seeking a stronger shared identity, helping fuel nationalism and religious politics.

Fukuyama contrasts liberalism's live-and-let-live principle with nationalist efforts to dominate neighboring countries, citing Putin's claims regarding Ukraine, Belarus, and other territories. He also argues that capitalist democracy can redirect ambitions into wealth accumulation without satisfying demands for political recognition, making competition dangerous when it becomes politicized.

Fukuyama presents China as the only plausible non-liberal-democratic competitor because it combines technological strength, social stability, and strong growth, while warning that the model's sustainability is uncertain. He says rising prosperity and education could eventually generate demands for political participation, and that dependence on particular leaders makes authoritarian systems vulnerable.

Fukuyama uses Tocqueville's account of the French Revolution to argue that expectations can rise faster than a regime's ability to accommodate them, a lesson he says Wang Qishan applied in opposing Gorbachev-style liberalization in China. This concern sits alongside his warning that China's emphasis on high-tech export growth could provoke international manufacturing backlash.