PodcastThe Monetary Matters NetworkHenry Peabody

The Fed Is Losing Control of Credit | Henry Peabody

Peabody argues that private credit, fixed-rate borrowing, and uneven exposure have weakened the Federal Reserve's traditional transmission mechanism, leaving consumers and marginal borrowers more vulnerable than high-quality businesses. He sees AI investment and onshoring sustaining capital demand, while higher real rates, opaque credit markets, and potential foreign-demand shifts create risks for borrowing and asset prices. His preferred approach emphasizes less-correlated strategies and selected structured assets, alongside a warning that policy may stay higher for longer before a more acute adjustment and higher, though not spiking, defaults.

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Key Takeaways

Peabody argues that monetary policy is transmitting unevenly because private credit and fixed-rate bonds insulate some borrowers, while consumers, housing demand, triple-C borrowers, and other marginal borrowers remain highly rate-sensitive. Mortgages near 6% and used-car loans above 7% are adding to affordability pressure, particularly for lower-income households.

AI investment and onshoring are supporting demand and contributing roughly 6% annualized in nominal GDP terms, but Peabody says they also require mammoth amounts of capital and push costs higher. In his view, reducing demand and inflation in this environment could require more aggressive Fed action than in recent cycles, even as policy may remain higher for longer.

Peabody links the post-2020 higher-inflation, higher-capital-cost regime to fiscal and monetary cooperation during COVID and says historically high real rates could attract capital if investors can earn roughly 2% to 3% real returns over 10 or 30 years. He also views nominal growth as an anchor for long-term rates, while noting that inflation breakevens have not moved materially wider.

Credit risks are building beneath a less transparent market structure: lending has shifted from banks into vehicles that provide less information about non-performing loans, reserves, asset values, and forced selling. Floating-rate leveraged loans and triple-C credit are particularly exposed, with coupons above 10% or even 12% and six-times-or-more leverage weakening interest coverage.

Peabody expects defaults to be higher in a year but explicitly does not forecast a spike, with software credit a particular concern because recoveries depend on intellectual property and projected cash flows rather than hard assets. He says the risk is amplified if businesses become obsolete or margins compress.

ECONOMY

Uneven Transmission — Private credit and fixed-rate bonds have weakened the Federal Reserve's traditional transmission mechanism. Rate hikes therefore affect borrowers unevenly: some AI borrowers may continue borrowing near 7%, while consumers and housing demand are much more rate-sensitive.

“The system has become certainly less banked and I breaking new ground when I say that the evolution of private credit as an example, the proliferation of fixed rate bonds…”—

Credit Divide — Credit is easy for businesses and very high-quality borrowers but tight for consumers, triple-C borrowers, and other marginal borrowers. Peabody describes this as a particularly acute divide in current credit conditions.

“So, the real theme is that credit is easy for businesses and tight for consumers and very easy for very high quality borrowers and very tight for lower quality borrowers.”—

Consumer Affordability — Moving away from zero rates has disproportionately affected consumers who need short-term financing, while inflation has been especially burdensome for lower-income households. Peabody says earlier gains in the weakest consumers' earnings power have been unwound, leaving affordability roughly flat relative to wages and inflation.

“One, the extent to which we've had to move rates off the zero bound…”—

MARKETS

Opaque Credit Cycle — Credit-market transparency has deteriorated as lending moved from banks into less-visible structures, reducing information about non-performing loans, reserves, asset values, and forced selling. Peabody says the credit cycle is predictable in principle, but a correction could already be developing without being clearly visible.

“There's a certain portion of credit today that although we're coming into this certainly lower levered than we were in the crisis, you don't have that observable mechanism…”—

Floating-Rate Stress — Higher rates are stressing leveraged loans and triple-C credit, where coupons can exceed 10% or even 12%. Because many loans are floating-rate, companies leveraged at six times or more face higher coupons and declining interest coverage.

“Triple C credit for example clearing coupon in triple C is well north of 10% probably north of 12. So there's pain to be had there…”—

AI Credit Pricing — Investment-grade issuance was forecast to be about $200 billion higher in the following quarter than a year earlier, while hyperscalers continued borrowing despite elevated rates. Markets were also grouping a broad range of AI-related companies together, contributing to relatively cheap credit-default-swap pricing for those names.

“I saw a forecast that investment grade supply is supposed to be about 200 billion higher over the next quarter than it was last year.”—

FORECASTS

Higher For Longer — Peabody expects policy to remain higher for longer until cracks begin to form, while warning that policymakers could overshoot and later need to ease. He says limited transparency and low interest-rate elasticity could make the eventual adjustment more acute.

“Well, the higher the risk is that the higher they go, the more they're going to have to ease after that…”—

Rates Through 2027 — The host says the Federal Reserve had raised rates to roughly 3.9% and signaled about 4.1% by year-end, with rates estimated to remain near 4.1% through the end of 2027. This remains the host's reported forecast, not an independently verified fact.

“Recently, the Federal Reserve raised rates now to basically 3.9% signaled that by the end of the year they want it at 4…”—

The Fed's Third Mandate

Henry Peabody describes an unofficial Fed mandate to transmit credit effectively, arguing that private credit and fixed-rate borrowing have weakened policy's connection to economic activity.

Banks vs. Private Credit

Peabody contrasts regulated banks, which respond more linearly to higher funding costs, with private lenders whose incentives and opaque marks can delay credit tightening and loss recognition.

How High Does the Fed Have to Go?

Peabody expects rates to remain higher for longer, with triple-C borrowers already facing significant pain, while fiscal sustainability may eventually constrain how high real rates can remain.

AI Borrowers Don't Care About Rates

The host and Peabody discuss why AI-related borrowers continue issuing debt despite high rates, while consumers and housing demand are much more interest-rate sensitive.

The Private Credit Cycle

Peabody views private credit as advancing through a predictable cycle driven by incentives, leverage, and yield-seeking capital, with opacity making the current turn difficult to identify.

Defaults, Recoveries, and Software Loans

Rising floating-rate coupons are pressuring leveraged borrowers, while opaque restructurings obscure defaults; Peabody expects higher defaults and especially poor recoveries for asset-light software loans.

GMO's Fixed Income Playbook

GMO is reducing broad beta and favoring valuation discipline, selected emerging-market assets, and less-correlated strategies because duration and traditional credit may no longer reliably hedge risk.

The Dollar and EM Debt

Peabody sees emerging-market local debt as attractive where low currencies and high real yields create favorable starting valuations, while warning that dollar strength and weakness are both plausible.

Structured Credit

GMO favors predictable, shorter-duration structured assets such as seasoned CLOs, student loans, and non-agency mortgages over broad vanilla credit exposure.

BDCs and Lessons from 2008

Peabody remains skeptical of yield-focused BDCs after observing return-of-capital practices and adverse portfolio selection during the financial crisis, though discounted assets can improve convexity.

The Fed's "Second Act"

Peabody argues that higher real rates, AI and onshoring capital demand, and fiscal pressures signal a higher-rate equilibrium before the Fed's eventual second act of aggressive easing.

Social Security and the Fiscal Reckoning

The discussion concludes that Social Security and broader entitlement reform will challenge bond-market financing, while long rates generally track nominal growth and credit remains sharply K-shaped.

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Important Disclaimers

Not Investment Advice: For education only — not financial, tax or legal advice.

AI-Generated: Made by AI from source transcripts and may contain errors.

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